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Abstract 
In recent time, Ghana has embarked on policies that aim to rebalance the role of public and private sector in the 
economy and thus emphasize private sector development. This paradigm shift is to encourage private investment 
and ultimately make private sector the engine of growth. The study is a time series analysis of private investment 
in Ghana covering annual data set from 1960-2010.  The study employed the techniques of co-integration and 
error correction modeling, which provided mechanisms to deal with the problems of unit root faced in time 
series data. In all, the study provides evidence that inflation, exchange rate, public investment, GDP, trade 
openness, aid, credit and external debt both in a short run and long run significantly affect the level of private 
investment. Also applying the general to specific approach to error correction model, statistical results suggested 
the existence of stable long run co-integrating relationships between macroeconomic and other variables and 
private investment.  
Key words: Ghana, Inflation, Private Investment, Exchange Rate, Aid, Credit, External Debt  
 
1. Introduction  
The idea of developing the private sector as an alternative development strategy in order to enhance economic 
activities in developing countries to help boost economic growth and reduce poverty began to gain credibility 
and substance as far back as the 1980s (Ouattara  2004). In recent times, there is broad base consensus that 
private sector led growth has a stronger positive impact on economic growth than public investment due to the 
fact that private investment is relatively more efficient than public sector investment (Frimpong & Marbuah 
2010).   
The OECD (2006) states that private sector has a leading and significant role to play in the war on poverty 
as far as Sub-Saharan countries are concern. In effect private investment is identified as imperative for 
promoting broad-based and sustained growth that will help drive poverty reduction. A study by Khan & Reinhart 
(1990) observes the rate of economic growth is largely a function of the level of investment. As a consequence 
countries in which investment remains sluggish over a prolonged period of time face endangered growth 
prospect due to the lack of capital accumulation (Chirinko 1993). The flows of private investment into 
developing economies have been impressive over the last two decades. The IMF attributes the surge in inflow to 
two factors which its sees as driving force for private investment toward emerging markets investors’ desire for 
portfolio diversification and higher profits, and macroeconomic and structural reforms in developing countries. 
Investors have become increasingly discriminating and show a marked preference for countries with sound 
policies. 
In spite of Ghana impressive economic growth in the last decade, the rate of saving and investment in 
Ghana remains significantly lower. To achieve sustained growth path, it is necessary, among other policies, to 
stimulate the investment process. But investment and savings in Ghana continues to be below levels necessary 
and sufficient to achieve sustained economic growth. This situation presents a real and credible threat to 
generating economic growth necessary to raise living standards through sufficient productive employment and 
consequently reduce poverty Asante (2000). Asante further argued that in most part of Ghana’s post independent 
history; the climate for private savings can best be described as hostile. Various sectors of the economy were 
characterized by low market competition, monopolistic tendencies and a high level of state owned enterprises in 
all essential sectors. 
A growing number of studies have been conducted on private investment but their domain has largely been 
in developed countries. Clearly it is equally important for policymakers in developing countries to be able to 
assess how private investment respond to changes in government policy-not only in designing long-term 
development strategies, but also in implementing short-term stabilization programs (Blejer & Khan 1984). Even 
if there is consensus that an increase in private investment has an unambiguous positive effect on economic 
output, it is still necessary to establish how private investment in developing countries is determined in particular, 
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what variables systematically affect it before one can evaluate the influence that government can exercise over 
private investment decisions that change the current and future growth rate of the economy (Khan & Knight 
1981). Ghana continues to be confronted with a number of constraints, including levels of savings and 
investment that are too low to fuel the growth needed to raise living standards and generate sufficient productive 
employment. This is worrisome because even mildly robust growth rates can be sustained over long periods only 
when an economy is able to maintain investment as a sizeable proportion of GDP. An understanding of 
investment patterns, and the factors that influence investment, is thus one of the key elements of a policy that 
fosters private investment.  
 
2.1Theories of Private Investment 
The theories of investment date back to Keynes (1936), who first called attention to the existence of an 
independent investment function in the economy. A central feature of the Keynesian analysis is the observation 
that although savings and investment must be identical ex-post, savings and investment decisions are, in general, 
taken by different decision makers and there is no reason why ex-ante savings should equal ex-ante investment. 
The next phase in the evolution of investment theory gave rise to the accelerator theory, which makes investment 
a linear proportion of changes in output. In the accelerator model, expectations, profitability and capital costs 
play no role. Keynesian theory has traditionally favoured the accelerator theory of investment while disregarding 
the role of factor costs. A more general form of the accelerator model is the flexible accelerator model. The basic 
notion behind this model is that the larger the gap between the existing capital stock and the desired capital stock, 
the greater a firm’s rate of investment. The hypothesis is that, firms plan to close a fraction of the gap between 
the desired capital stock, K*, and the actual capital stock, K, in each period. This gives rise to a net investment 
equation of the form of: 
I = δ (K* - K-1)………….. (1) 
Where I = net investment, K* = desired capital stock, K-1 = last period’s capital stock, and δ = partial 
adjustment coefficient. Within the framework of the flexible accelerator model, output, internal funds, cost of 
external financing and other variables may be included as determinants of K*. The flexible accelerator 
mechanism may be transformed into a theory of investment behaviour by adding a specification of K* and a 
theory of replacement investment. Alternative econometric models of investment behaviour differ in the 
determinants of K*, the characterization of the time structure of the investment process and the treatment of 
replacement investment. In the flexible accelerator model, K* is proportional to output, but in alternative models, 
K* depends on capacity utilization, internal funds, the cost of external finance and other variables. 
Jorgenson (1971) and others have formulated the neoclassical approach, which is a version of the flexible 
accelerator model. In this approach, the desired or optimal capital stock is proportional to output and the user 
cost of capital (which in turn depends on the price of capital goods, the real rate of interest, the rate of 
depreciation and the tax structure). In the “Q” theory of investment (which is also in the neoclassical framework) 
associated with Tobin (1969), the ratio of the market value of the existing capital stock to its replacement cost 
(the “Q” ratio) is the main force driving investment. Tobin argues that delivery lags and increasing marginal cost 
of investment are the reasons why Q would differ from unity. Another approach known as “neoliberal” 
emphasizes the importance of financial deepening and high interest rates in stimulating growth. The proponents 
of this approach are McKinnon (1973).The core of his argument rests on the claim that developing countries 
suffer from financial repression (which is generally equated with controls on interest rates in a downward 
direction) and that if these countries were liberated from their repressive conditions, this would induce savings, 
investment and growth. Not only will liberalization increase savings and loanable funds, it will result in a more 
efficient allocation of these funds, both contributing to a higher economic growth. In the neoliberal view, 
investment is positively related to the real rate of interest in contrast with the neoclassical theory. The reason for 
this is that a rise in interest rates increases the volume of financial savings through financial intermediaries and 
thereby raises investible funds, a phenomenon that McKinnon (1973) calls the “conduit effect”. Thus, while it 
may be true that demand for investment declines with the rise in the real rate of interest, realized investment 
actually increases because of the greater availability of funds. This conclusion applies only when the capital 
market is in disequilibrium with the demand for funds exceeding supply. 
It is clear from the discussion in this section that private investment depends on three broad categories of 
variables: Keynesian, neoclassical, and uncertainty variables. Variables that may be included in the Keynesian 
tradition include growth rate of GDP, internal funds and capacity utilization. The neoclassical determinants of 
private investment include Tobin’s Q, real interest rate, user cost of capital and public investment ratio. There 
are three uncertainty variables. The first is variability (variance, moving standard deviation or moving coefficient 
of variation) of the user cost of capital, real exchange rate, inflation rate, distortions in the foreign exchange 
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market (proxied by the black market premium) and real GDP. The second uncertainty variable is the debt/GDP 
ratio and the third is debt service as a ratio of exports of goods and services.   
2.2 Determinants of Private investment 
There is a finite limit for domestic savings, public investment would in some cases pose a severe constraint for 
private investment and would crowd out private investment. Balassa (1988) in his study of 30 countries showed 
the presence of a negative relationship between private investment and public investment. Duncan et al. (1999) 
is of the opinion that such a negative relationship might not exist in the case of Pacific islands, which have no 
difficulties accessing foreign savings. The literature is fairly settled on the factors that constrained or otherwise 
determine private investment. Authors like Greene & Villanueva (1991); Duncan et al. (1999) have carried out 
empirical and stochastic investigations on the determinants of private Investment. Most of them discovered that 
Private investment behaviour is primarily influenced by the profit motive in addition to other factors such as 
wage rate, real exchange rate policies, and raw material costs, rate of inflation and appropriate pricing of capital, 
labour and land.  
Aside from the factors listed above, private investment would flourish in a supportive environment of cost 
reductions in power, transport and communications, which are often provided through public investment. For 
instance, Greene & Villanueva (1991) carried out an Empirical studies on 23 countries and found that public 
investment in physical infrastructure is complementary to private investment. However, as there is a finite limit 
for domestic savings, public investment would, in some cases, poses a severe constraint for private investment 
and would crowd out private investment. Balassa (1988) in his study of 30 countries concluded that the presence 
of a negative relationship between private investment and public investment. In collaborating of these findings, 
Duncan et al. (1999) pointed out that such a negative relationship might not exist in the case of Pacific Islands, 
which have no difficulties accessing foreign savings.  
According to Duncan et al. (1999), user cost of capital is an important factor in any investment decision by 
the private sector. When the user cost of capital is increased by raising the cost of bank credit or by increasing 
the cost of retained earnings, which is the main source of financing investment, there is a decline in investment. 
Whereas there is a consensus in the literature on the factors discussed so far, findings of various empirical 
studies are not, however, consistent on the relationship between interest rates and investment. While certain 
studies such as Green & Villanueva (1991), have confirmed the negative relationship between interest rates and 
investment, study by others have shown that in repressed financial markets, credit policy affects investment in a 
distorted manner.  
Thomas, (1997) in his study of 86 developing countries examined data on terms of trade, real exchange 
rates, property rights and civil liberties and concluded that while factors including credit, availability and the 
quality of physical and human infrastructure are important influences, uncertainty in the investment environment 
was negatively related to private investment in sub-Saharan countries. Employing the variability in real exchange 
rates as an explanatory variable in regression analysis, in his cross-country study on the macroeconomic 
environment and private investment in six Pacific Island countries observed a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the variability in the real exchange rate and private investment.  
Duncan et al. (1999) argued that although variability in the real exchange rate is a reasonable proxy for 
instability in major economic variables as fluctuations in inflation and productivity. Generally, fiscal and 
monetary management are reflected in the real exchange rate, which is not a good measure of the uncertainty 
attached to policy or the insecurity of property rights and enforcement of contracts or the level of corruption. It 
has been observed that these non-economic factors appear to have significant influence on investment in the 
Pacific Island countries. However, Duncan et al. (1999) admitted that no quantitative or qualitative evidence is 
available of their size or their impact. In the absence of such evidence, any study on private investment is to be 
necessarily restricted to the conventional variables.  
It has been observed by many researchers that monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies for correcting 
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances are bound to affect private investment. There are two ways by which 
restrictive monetary and credit policies included in stabilization packages affect investment. These are the rise in 
the real cost of bank credit and the opportunity cost of retained earnings from higher interest rates. The user cost 
of capital is increased by both mechanisms, leading to a reduction in investment. Van Wijnbergen (1982) 
however noted that credit policy affects investment directly, because credit is allocated to firms with access to 
preferential interest rates rather than through the indirect interest rate channel. Thus the effect of monetary and 
credit policy on investment and the means of transmission depend on the institutional structure of financial 
markets. 
 A formal framework for studying private investment in developing countries was developed by Blejer & 
Khan (1984).Tun Wai & Wong (1982) incorporated features of the neoclassical model into investment models 
for developing countries. Their approaches take into account the relevant data problems and structural features 
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that caused a gap between the modem theory of investment and the models that were specified for developing 
countries. Blejer & Khan (1984) focused on the role of government policy and derived an explicit functional 
relationship between the principal policy instruments and private capital formation. Using the model they were 
able to assess the extent of any “crowding out”. The second extension that Blejer & Khan (1984) did was to 
make a distinction between government investment that is related to the development of infrastructure and 
government investment of other kinds. Blejer & Khan (1984) found a positive relationship between the share of 
private investment in total investment and the ratio of total investment to income. They also found that the larger 
the share of private investment, the higher the average growth rate of the economy. These patterns indicate the 
relevance of private investment behaviour in developing countries and call for the testing of formal models of 
private capital formation in individual countries. 
Two principal conclusions emerged from Blejer & Khan’s (1984) tests of formal model for 24 developing 
countries. The first was the possibility of identifying well behaved empirical function for private investment in 
developing countries. This challenged the traditional view that standard investment theory is not relevant for 
developing countries. The second conclusion was the establishment of a direct empirical link between 
government policy variables and private capital formation. Asante (2000) estimated a private investment 
equation that tried to assess the determinants of private investment in Ghana. Among the independent variables 
were the incremental capital output ratio, the lending rate, the exchange rate, credit to the private sector and 
public investment. His preliminary results showed among other things a “crowding out” effect of public 
investment. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Model specification  
 An investment model for Ghana can be specified in a function form as:  
PRIVINV = f (GDP, PUBINV, CREDIT, INFL, EXDEBT, INST, REX, AID, OPENNESS, 
INFRA) ………………………… (2) 
Where, 
PRIVINV = Private investment; AID = Foreign Aid; REX = Real Effective Exchange Index; GDP= Real GDP 
growth; CREDIT= Real private sector credit; INST= political instability (1=Constitutional Rule and 0= 
Unconstitutional Rule); EXDEBT = External debt burden; INFRA= Infrastructure; OPENNESS= Trade 
openness; PUBINV=Public investment 
 Econometrically, to include the random error term, the explicit econometric model is formulated as:  
InPRIVINVi,t = α + β1InGDPi,t + β2InPUBINVi,t + β3InCREDITi,t + β4INFLi,t +        β5InEXDEBTi,t +  
β6INSTi,t  +  β7InREXi,t  +   β8InAIDi,t  +  β9InOPENNESS i,t  + β10InINFRAi,t  +  εi ………..(3) 
 Where, In  natural logarithm, t time,   i=1…n, εi= Error term  
 
 3.2 A Priori Assumptions/ Expectations 
H1: GDP is expected to exert a positive effect on private investment. As a result, the study expects the 
coefficient of GDP to be positive (β1>0). 
H2:Public investment may one hand crowd-out private investment via increased deficits and a high interest rate 
and the competition for certain scarce resources. However, public investment may act as crowding-in catalyst 
through the provision of key infrastructure. The effect of public investment is ambiguous: β2<0 implies 
crowding-out whereas β2>0 suggest crowding-in. 
H3: Increasing credit by the banking sector to the private sector is likely to boost private sector investment. Thus 
the effect of credit to the private sector is expected to be positive (β3>0). 
H4: Macroeconomic instability may increase uncertainty and adversely affect private investment. A high 
inflation rate is expected to negatively affect private investment. Therefore, the study expects the coefficient to 
be negative (β4<0). 
H5: Excessive debt overhang may inhibit investment in many indebted countries because the possibility that 
confiscatory future taxation could be used to finance future debt service. Thus, a large external debt-to-GDP 
ratio is likely to have a negative impact on private investment. The coefficient of external debt is expected to be 
negative (β5<0) in the case of Ghana.  
H6: (Dummy), a regime of constitutional rule ensures well functioning democratic institutions, which is a 
precondition for a favourable investment climate. Non-constitutional transfers of executive power (i.e. coups) are 
particularly likely to increase uncertainty. Thus, a socio-politically stable environment where property rights and 
contracts are enforced through a properly functioning judicial system will have a positive impact on private 
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investment. Thus, the coefficient of political instability (dummy) variable in the model is expected to be positive 
(β6>0). 
H7: On the other hand, depreciation of the exchange rate increases the cost of imported capital goods, and thus 
decreases investment in import dependent production sectors. Thus the effect of real exchange rate on private 
investment (i.e. β7) is also ambiguous. 
H8: Foreign aid flows can increase private sector investment through the conditionality attached to them. One 
condition attached to these flows since that the recipient country has to privatise some publicly owned 
enterprises. The study expects the coefficient to be positive (β8>0). 
H9: The degree of trade openness is expected to have a positive influence on private investment. This is because 
among other things it signals to investors the readiness of an economy to investment (β9>0).    
H10: Infrastructure complements private investment by lowering the cost of production and increase access to 
domestic markets. Following from this, it is expected that infrastructure development will induce investment by 
private enterprise (β10>0).  
 
3.3 Source of Data 
Data on private investment are issued from the Global Development Network Database of the World Bank.  Data 
on all other aggregate variables are from World Development Indicators of the World Bank. These include 
aggregate indicators such as infrastructure, external debt, foreign aid etc. It must be emphasize that all data series 
are annual and span through the period, 1960 – 2010. 
 
3.4 Data Analytical Tool 
The selection of the analytical tool is contingent on a thorough review of available analytical and statistical tools. 
In deciding which test is appropriate to use, it is important to consider the type of variables that you have (i.e., 
whether your variables are categorical, ordinal or interval and whether they are normally distributed). 
Consequently, parametric statistical method specifically ordinary least square was use to estimate the coefficient 
of the variables. OLS was used to analyze relationship between dependent variable and independent variables. 
The robustness of the coefficient was used to determine the nature of the relationship and also whether it is 
statistically significant. The software adopted for this study was the E-Views econometric software.  
 
4. Discussion of results         
The rationale for the inclusion of GDP growth is due to accelerator effects, it hypothesis that high economic 
growth would to lead to higher investment rates (Mlambo & Oshikoya, 2001). The estimated coefficient of GDP 
is positive as expected but insignificant in the short run. However in the long run, the associated coefficient of 
GDP is both positive and statistically significant. Specifically, 1% increase in GDP causes 40.56% increase 
private investment. This implies that output recovery will in the long induce private investment. This indicates 
that real GDP growth is a determinant of private investment, confirming similar results by Mlambo & Oshikoya 
(2001) and Frimpong & Marbuah (2010). Apkalu (2002); Frimpong & Marbuah (2010) argue that firms in 
Ghana in the short-run usually operate below full capacity as a consequence, increasing aggregate demand does 
not cause an immediate increase in capital stock. These authors further suggest that given the adjustment 
mechanism in investment behaviour, existing and potential investors will take a little longer time to adjust to 
growth in real output, hence its short term positive impact may not be experienced.  
A weak currency may affect investment through its effect on aggregate demand. If the net effect is 
contradictory, then the slump in economic activity is likely to lead to a reduction in investment. However, if the 
net effect is expansionary, devaluation may raise real incomes and stimulate investment. Also, if devaluation is 
considered inevitable, then when it happens, confidence in the future may be raised. Devaluation may affect the 
real price of imported inputs that are used in conjunction with capital goods to produce output, and may also 
affect interest rates, which in turn will affect private investment. As shown in Table 3, real effective exchange 
rate is positively related to private investment in the short run. But the coefficient associated with real effective 
exchange rate is insignificant. Contrary to short run, the estimated coefficient for long run is negative and 
statistically significant. In the long run, 1% changes in depreciation of the Cedis relative to major currencies 
cause a decrease of about 0.113956 % in private investments in Ghana. This result is consistent with Bakare 
(2011) findings which show a negative relationship between devaluation and private investment in Nigeria. It 
may be argued that devaluation hampers the acquisition of foreign exchange for the importation of needed inputs 
for investment. Depreciation of exchange rate may increase the cost of importing inputs and raw materials for 
domestic investment.         
Bank loans remain the overwhelming source of financing for most firms and businesses in Ghana. In the 
light of this fact, it implies the availability of credit plays a significant role in boosting private investment. As 
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highlighted in Table 3, credit to private investment is both positive and significant in the short run. This implies 
that availability of credit to private investment significantly affect the levels of private investment in Ghana. The 
estimated coefficient associated credit to private investment is (0.091728). The significance of this result is that 
monetary policy that directs credit to the private sector in Ghana is expected to encourage private investment in 
Ghana.  
The fiscal conditions pertaining in Ghana as the result in Table 3 indicates that it significantly affect private 
investment. High levels of external debt as suggested by the results in the long-run negatively affect private 
investment. The estimated coefficient for external debt is (-0.43655). This implies that successive governments 
in Ghana should pursue policy of fiscal consolidation since a reduction of the public deficit during 
macroeconomic adjustments allows private investment to expand. Serven & Salimano (1992) argue that how 
public deficit is corrected may affect private investment differently. If the reduction of public deficit involves 
cutting back on public investment in components of infrastructure such as roads, ports and communication 
networks, which may be complementary with private investment, then there will be a decline in private 
investment. 
 The result is contrary to findings of Frimpong & Marbuah (2010) on the impact of external debt on private 
investment. The authors found that external debt encourages private sector investment in Ghana rather than 
discourage it. In their view, high external debt levels signal a good credit standing though it must be mentioned 
that their estimated coefficient was not significant.  A high rate of inflation will tend to discourage private 
savings and investment. This calls for prudent fiscal policies, as well as disciplined monetary policies including 
self-denial. Investment is depressed by overall macroeconomic instability. However, the results show that 
inflation rate has a positive impact on private investment level in Ghana, both in the short and long run, as the 
inflation variable is positive and significant in both cases. The results thus suggest that 1% increase in inflation 
causes a 6.74% and 3.0897 % for short and long run respectively. Thus the short-run and long-run results 
indicate that inflation has been a stimulant for private investment rather than discourage it. 
There is evidence that supports the theory of ‘crowding out’ as public investment affects negatively and 
significantly private investment in the context of Ghana. The associated coefficient of public investment is 
negative and significant (-23.42) in the short run. This shows that there is competition for resources between the 
public and the private sector (Acosta & Loza 2005). This result confirms Frimpong and Marbuah (2010) and 
Shafik (1992) in the context of Ghana and Egypt respectively. The influence of political stability on private 
investments measured in the form of a dummy variable. This dummy variable recorded a positive sign in the 
short run and the long run periods and is significant. This implies that constitutional overthrows or military 
takeovers will affect private investment negatively by creating an adverse climate to private investment. This 
signifies that multi-party democracy can serve as inducement to private investment. Thus, present democracy 
which appears considerably stable must have contributed positively to private investments in Ghana. This is 
consistent with findings from Bakare   (2011); Frimpong & Marbuah (2010). 
The effect of trade openness on private investment is found to be positive and statistically significant only 
in the long-run. For short run, though positive it was found to be statistically insignificant. This signifies that 
trade liberalization in the long term boast private investment. To this end, government should sustain policies 
that promote free trade. In the case of foreign aid the estimated coefficient is found to be unstable. The 
associated coefficient in the long short run is (-0.15902) however, in the short run the coefficient is positive 
(0.75354), a situation which makes it impossible to establish the nature of the relationship between foreign aid 
and private investment. Finally, the variable 
t-1 
corrects for the long run equilibrium, and is significant for this 
study the negative sign show how equilibrium is restored. The magnitude of the coefficient of this term ( -0.4045) 
implies that after a shock is given to the system, it takes approximately four periods, which corresponds to four 
years in our study, for private investment to restore its equilibrium level. The significance of the coefficient 
associated with the error correction term further supports the acceptance of the co-integration hypothesis. 
 
5. Findings 
This study examined the determinants of private investment in Ghana. The study shows various major variables 
either hamper or encourage investment in Ghana. They are GDP, inflation, political stability, external debt, 
exchange rate, public investment, aid, trade openness and credit provided to private sector. 
The study shows that GDP growth has and statistically significant impacts on the levels of private 
investment in the long run as opposed to short run. Specifically, 1% increase in GDP causes 40.56% increase 
private investment signifying that output recovery will in the long induce private investment. The effect of debt 
overhang on private investment is found to be adverse. High levels of external debt as in the long-run negatively 
affect private investment. The estimated coefficient for external debt is (-0.43655). This implies that successive 
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governments in Ghana should pursue policy of fiscal consolidation since a reduction of the public deficit during 
macroeconomic adjustments allows private investment to expand.  
The research found no evidence that rate of inflation tend to discourage private investment. The results 
show that inflation rate has a positive impact on private investment level in Ghana, both in the short and long run, 
as the inflation variable is positive and significant in both cases. The results thus suggest that 1 % increase in 
inflation causes a 6.74% and 3.0897 % for short and long run respectively. Thus the short-run and long-run 
results indicate that inflation has been a stimulant for private investment rather than discourage it. The study also 
shows that private investment and public investment are not complementary. Rather, public investment crowded 
out private investment in Ghana. The associated coefficient of public investment is negative and significant (-
23.42) in a short run. This shows that there is competition for resources between the public and the private sector. 
Real effective exchange rate is found to be positively related to private investment in the short run. But the 
coefficient associated with real effective exchange rate is insignificant. Contrary to short run, the estimated 
coefficient for long run is negative and statistically significant. In the long run, 1% changes in depreciation of the 
Cedis relative to major currencies cause a decrease of about 0.113956 % in private investments in Ghana. The 
effect of trade openness on private investment is found to be positive and statistically significant only in the 
long-run. For short run, though positive it was found to be statistically insignificant. This signifies that trade 
liberalization in the long term boast private investment. To this end, government should sustain policies that 
promote free trade. Another vital finding of this research was how political stability affects private investment in 
Ghana. The associated coefficient was positive in the short run and the long run periods. Implying multi-party 
democracy with it attendant political certainty induces private investment. Conversely constitutional overthrows 
and military takeovers affect private investment negatively by creating an adverse climate to it. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The main aim of this paper was to investigate the factors that influence the levels of private investment within 
the context of Ghana over the period 1960-2010.  The specific objective was to identify the determinants and 
their respective nature of relationship with private investment both in the short run and long run perspectives. 
The study employed the techniques of co-integration and error correction modeling, which provided mechanisms 
to deal with the problems of unit root faced in time series data. In all, the study provides evidence that inflation, 
exchange rate, public investment, GDP, trade openness, aid and external debt both in a short run and long run 
significantly affect the level of private investment. Applying the general to specific approach to error correction 
model, statistical results suggested the existence of stable long run co-integrating relationships between 
macroeconomic and other variables and private investment. Overall, variables that affect private investment are 
consistent with most of the hypothesised signs and are also found to be statistically significant.  
 
7. Recommendations  
1. If the private sector is to remain the engine of growth in the economy as envisioned by many Ghanaian policy 
makers, then the amount of credit to private sector should be encouraged by providing incentives to financial 
institutions. Appropriate policies should be pursued to ensure considerable and sustainable credit to 
entrepreneurs to lend more to private businesses.  
2. It is evident that public investment impedes private investment. This deleterious effect of public investment on 
private investment can be rectified by moderating the degree of public investment whiles increasing the role of 
private investment in the provision of social goods. Furthermore, public investments should be made on areas 
that complement private investment rather that hamper private investment.  
3. A weak currency contributes to macroeconomic instability, a factor identified as a major hindrance to private 
investments. This fact demands that monetary authorities in Ghana should endeavor to ensure the stability of the 
cedis against major currencies. Such policy direction will engender positive response from the private sector.  
 4. There is overwhelming evidence that constitutional overthrows depressed significantly the levels of private 
investment in Ghana due to its associated political uncertainty. This suggests that Ghana stands to gain 
enormously by deepening multiparty democracy through strengthening of political institutions that safeguard 
constitutional rule. 
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Notes 
Table 1: The results of the intercept form of ADF test where a unit root null hypothesis is tested against a 
stationary alternative. 
Results of Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
Variable ADF in Levels ADF in difference Order of Integration Number of Lags 
LnPRIVINV (1.256384) 
3.615588 
2.941145 
(6.863474) 
3.621023* 
2.943427** 
I (1) 3 
LnOPENESS (1.811285)  
3.632900 
 2.922449 
(5.089592) 
3.574446* 
2.923780** 
I(1) 3 
LnREX (2.418110)  
3.679322 
 2.967767 
(3.54488) 
3.679322* 
2.971853** 
I(1) 3 
LnAID (4.339753) 
3.57444* 
2.923730** 
(8.115411) 
 3.574446* 
 2.923780** 
I(0)/I(1) 3 
LnGDP (2.29350) 
3.57446 
2.923730 
(6.29350) 
3.57446* 
2.923730** 
I(1) 3 
INFL (4.905337) 
3.571310* 
2.922449** 
(8.766819) 
 3.577723*  
2.925169** 
I(0)/I(1) 3 
LnEXTDEBT (1.506992)      
3.610453 
2.938987   
(5.594988)  
3.615588* 
2.941145** 
I(1) 3 
LnINFRA (2.376322) 
3.621484 
2.942317 
(7.368735)  
3.615588* 
2.941145** 
I(2) 3 
LnPUBINV (2.3598) 
3.57224 
2.92366 
(6.243178) 
3.623247* 
2.926434** 
I(1) 3 
LnCREDIT (0.795710) 
3.568308 
2.921175 
(7.913551) 
3.571310* 
2.922449** 
I(1) 3 
 * (**) denotes significance at 1 %( 5%) levels respectively 
      I (d) = Order of integration 
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Table 2.Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend 
Series: INST, InAID, InEXDEBT, INFL, InGDP, InOPENESS, InPRIVINV, InREX,  
InPUBINV, InCREDIT. 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
 
Hypothesized  
No. of CE(s) 
 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 0.05  
Critical Value 
Prob.** 
None* 0.999997 834.0692 197.3709 0.0001 
At most 1* 0.997922 479.2985 159.5297 0.0000 
At most 2* 0.962740 306.3582 125.6154 0.0000 
At most 3* 0.936587 214.2429 95.75366 0.0000 
At most 4* 0.908172 137.0165 69.81889 0.0000 
At most 5* 0.720701 70.15694 47.85613 0.0001 
At most 6* 0.509441 34.44376 29.79707 0.0136 
At most 7 0.368812 14.50188 15.49471 0.0702 
At most 8 0.056136 1.617650 3.841466 0.2034 
Trace Test indicates 8 co integration eqn(s) at the 0.05 Level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesizes at the 0.05 Level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigen Value) 
Hypothesized  
No. of CE(s) 
 
Eigenvalue Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05  
Critical Value 
Prob.** 
None* 0.999997 354.7706 58.43354 0.0000 
At most 1* 0.997922 172.9403 52.36261 0.0000 
At most 2* 0.962740 92.11529 42.23140 0.0000 
At most 3* 0.936587 77.22636 40.07757 0.0000 
At most 4* 0.908172 66.85959 33.87687 0.0000 
At most 5* 0.720701 35.71318 27.58434 0.0036 
At most 6* 0.509441 19.94187 21.13162 0.0727 
At most 7 0.368812 12.88423 14.26460 0.0816 
At most 8 0.056136 1.617650 3.841466 0.2034 
Trace Test indicates 8 co integration eqn(s) at the 0.05 Level 
*denotes rejection of the hypothesizes at the 0.05 Level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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Table 3. Results of Error correction model (ECM) within the environment of vector error correction 
model (VECM) 
Dependent Variable: Private investment 
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-statistics 
∆lnAID t                   0.753540                0.196970 3.825600** 
∆lnOPENNES t          0.762720 0.412560 1.847800 
∆lnEXDEBT t            3.166740 0.242402 1.192660 
∆lnPUBINVt           -23.421300 11.126200 -2.105000** 
∆ INFL t 6.743540 3.306780 2.039340** 
∆lnGDP t                   26.414300 19.287420 1.144020 
∆lnCREDIT t             0.091728 0.034950 2.624150** 
∆lnREX t                    0.242402 0.767624 0.315740 
InOPENNESt-1             1.293924 0.287760 4.496530** 
InEXDEBTtt-1 -0.436550 0.124081 -3.518346** 
INFLt-1 3.06789 1.385670 2.214080** 
InGDPt-1                         40.57890 20.156450 2.013360** 
InCRIDITt-1                    0.002634 0.001505 1.750282 
InREXt-1 -0.313956 0.119994 -2.616519** 
InAIDt-1                         -0.159020 0.066741 -2.382648** 
InPUBINVt-1              60.234500 39.246790 1.534800 
INST t-1 0.222992 0.074645 2.987440** 
  t-1                          -0.404500 0.193400 -2.091500** 
R
2
 0.753400   
Observations (n)   51   
 
